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Power, politics and everyday life:  
the local rationalities of social movement milieux 
Introduction: the cultural roots of political conflicti 
Everyday language readily identifies social movement activity - campaigning, 
protesting, holding meetings, issuing statements - as "politics"; perhaps not 
in the sense of parties and parliaments, but politics none the less. Much 
academic literature shares this view of social movements as "politics by 
other means", from resource mobilisation and political opportunity structure 
approaches to analyses of social movements as expressions of economic 
interests (for an overview, see Diani 1992a). It is interesting, then, that 
precisely in continental Europe, where contemporary social movements have 
arguably made the greatest impact on the party system and engaged in the 
sharpest confrontations with the state, theorists have tended more and more 
to stress the cultural aspects of social movements. 
One theme sees movements as rooted in specific sociocultural milieux: 
largescale, ñlifestyleî responses to structured experience of inequality, with 
differing issues and priorities (Vester et al. 1993, Hradil 1987); and local 
ñmovement milieuxî within these, and the shifts in class habiti that can be 
identified between generations here (MÙller 1990). Another approach 
identifies a shared culture as a structural element of social movement 
activity: as an identity enabling the networks between organisations, groups 
and individuals that make up a movement (Diani 1992a, 1992b); or as 
ñcognitive praxisî combining worldview, issue-specific knowledge and modes 
of organisation (Eyerman and Jamison 1991). Thirdly, social movements can 
be analysed as cultural challenges: movements may struggle to control the 
cultural definition of ñhistoricityî, societal self-production (Touraine 1981, 
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1985); their structural form may itself be a symbolic message to the wider 
society (Melucci 1985, 1989, 1992); or there may be a division between 
ñpoliticalî and ñculturalî movement strategies (Raschke 1985).  
The "social movements" problematic could then be restated with an 
emphasis on the culture of movement milieux as the source of mobilisation, 
of the internal culture of movement activity, and of wider challenges to the 
social order. The need is then to locate particular forms of engagement with 
power and the political within particular sociocultural formations. One 
possible response is the critical theory analysis of movements as defending 
the communicative rationality of the lifeworld against colonisation by 
capitalist and state rationalities (Habermas 1984, 1987). Yet while 
particular, "decommodified" lifeworlds are identified as crucial (Offe 1985), it 
is a long way from a universal communicative rationality to the specific 
cultural logics of contemporary lifeworlds. If instrumental rationalisation had 
specific roots in Calvinist soteriology, so communicative rationalisation must 
have particular beginnings. 
A partial remedy is Eder's (1985, 1993) analysis of contemporary movements 
as expressing the habitus of the petite bourgeoisie and its struggle to impose 
its cultural definitions; yet this habitus is ascribed rather than examined, 
read off from the structural position of the class – and unsurprisingly 
contradicted by the Hannover project’s findings of significant transformations 
in class habitus within movement milieux (MÙller 1990, Vester et al. 1993). 
Both critical theory and Eder's approach offer to relate movement activities 
to movement milieux, but both fail to take account of the cultural specificity 
of the latter. The issue is then how to theorise, and research, such 
specificity. 
The concept of local rationalities 
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What is needed is a heuristic concept that does not already assume a 
specific cultural content. Such a concept would have to make it possible to 
link the culture of movement milieux with the forms of activity and 
challenges raised by social movements; avoid an a priori exclusion of the 
political or the cultural; and enable an empirical engagement with the 
cultural specificities of actual movement milieux. I want to suggest the 
concept of "local rationalities" as a means of doing this. 
The specific cultures of movement milieux are ñlocalî, contingent in relation 
to an abstract theory of modernity yet not necessarily in relation to actual 
societies. To stress contingency is to avoid the purely rationalist imputation 
of a particular culture to such milieux on the basis of abstract 
considerations, and to encourage the realist attempt to relate theory to the 
phenomenal world (McLennan 1981) or, less grandly, to keep the question 
open. 
"Rationality" then indicates the ontological level on which this culture is 
being sought. By analogy with the typologies of rationality developed by 
Weber (1984) and Habermas (1984), it implies a formal characteristic about 
the way we make sense of and engage with the world which is capable of 
being generalised and taking on a life of its own. Thus the formal principle of 
a rational calculation of which means are best suited to achieve given ends 
enables that particular rethinking of the world we call modernity. Starting 
from a specific problem in a specific cultural milieu, it could be generalised 
to encompass all aspects of action and be used to restructure any other 
milieu. Thus I am looking, within specific movement milieux, for formal 
elements in the way people act, talk and make sense of the world which can 
be generalised to restructure many areas of activity, notably linking everyday 
life with movement action. 
Elements of local rationalities 
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The discussion which follows is drawn from research in progress in Dublin 
"movement milieux". I am researching in particular a network formed inter 
alia in London squats, Dublin crashpads, a student occupation and anti-
nuclear and ecological organisations, which has in turn formed a context for 
a variety of alternative "political" and "cultural" projects and experiments, 
such as: 
 Political projects, such as anarchist and green groups, street theatre, 
student politics, direct action, etc.; 
 Experimentation with living forms, in particular shared houses, squats 
and "crashpads"; 
 Economic experiments, such as cooperatives, alternative bookshops, 
LETS systems, etc.; 
 Experimentation with sexual relationships, including bisexual, open and 
multiple relationships; 
 Experimentation with drugs, in particular hash, acid and mushrooms; 
 Cultural experiments, such as alternative music, , Rainbow Gatherings, 
pagan and occultist rituals and groups, etc. 
This paper draws on five interviews of my series with members of this 
network: three men and two women, all in their mid- to late-twenties when 
interviewed. For reasons of internal privacy and external protection all 
names have been changed. Four are Irish, one is a European immigrant; 
class backgrounds range from skilled working class to professional, and 
occupations at the time of interview included unskilled worker, residential 
care worker, research student and computer programmer. 
The "local rationalities" of this network, as they appear above all in interview 
material, stress specific forms of autonomy and reflexivity: autonomy as self-
development and what could be called "lifeworld reflexivity" as the 
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suspension of the "taken-for-granted" attitude, and the willingness to make 
changes, in all areas of activity. 
Autonomy as self-development 
The principle of autonomy is of course not a new one within modernity 
(Wagner 1994). Yet most modern formulations take the self for granted. Thus 
instrumental rationality treats both the self and its goal as assumptions, 
and enquires merely what the most effective way of getting from A to B is. 
Even in its most hedonistic forms, possessive individualism is simply a 
special case of this approach. Romanticism, commonly ascribed to 
movement milieux, assumes that there is a natural, pre-given - and already 
known - self, albeit obscured by conventions and civilisation, and that the 
issue is one of placing this natural self first. Yet the logic of autonomy 
presented within this lifeworld places the self in question, as an open-ended 
project, something to be constructed or transformed. Thus participants 
make comments along the following lines: 
Ciar‡n is ambitious within himself, it's himself that he wants to 
develop, not a career or any of that kind of stuff. (Josh) 
Another participant speaks of 
People who do all kinds of odd and extremely innovative things, an 
awful lot of people whose top priority is sorting their head out, or whose 
top priority is something along the lines of enlightenment. (Ruth) 
In this context, the pursuit of autonomy and self-realisation is explicitly 
contrasted to the goal-rational pursuit of material interests: 
It comes back to this idea that the way in which people perceive 
ambition as not a material ambition, which again links back to the 
ideas about people's attitude to property and that. Whilst they have 
fuck all of it, I don't think that is entirely responsible for their attitude. 
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The development is sort of personal development, it's not material 
development. So the idea of going away to make money isn't really, 
you're not going to impress anybody, really. 'Oh wow, he's earning 
fuckloads of money, good for him, so what?' (Josh) 
The main theme is that of moving away from instrumental approaches, for 
example, that of seeking the best available employment, towards an 
explorative approach to one's own life. This explorative sense is underlined 
by the relatively weak articulation of the nature of the alternatives and how 
to get there: it is not simply choosing an alternative strategy to achieve pre-
existing goals. Rather, goals are something to be revised along the way. 
Similarly, instead of identifying with a fixed self (whether the given self of 
instrumentalism or the "true" self of romanticism), the self is seen as 
something to develop. One takes a distance from "the self" in order to change 
it or observe it changing.  
The politics of autonomy 
It is then in keeping with this logic that the instrumentally rational pursuit 
of politics in the narrow sense is often rejected outright in the name of 
autonomy: 
LC: Groups are bad things? 
- Yeah, kind of limiting. If you try and set up anything a lot of these 
people will just go 'I'm not interested'. You know, if they happened to be 
somewhere and something happened they'd go for it, but anything 
organised they're not interested in, anything that sounds remotely 
political they don't want to know. 
LC: Why is that? 
- Don't believe in politics, a lot of people just find it boring, or completely 
pointless, or they live their life the way they want to and they live and 
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let live, if other people want to get into politics. You know, it would kind 
of be 'if you're into politics that's your trip, whereas me, I just want to 
wander round and play guitar.'  (Ruth) 
If politics is "your trip", it is simply one way among many of pursuing the 
project of self-development. Alternatively, it may be a means of defending the 
free space required for the pursuit of autonomy: 
Politics is the mechanism by which decisions that affect my life are 
made, therefore if I wish to have any control over my life I must have 
an interest in politics, but it is not the driving force of my life. (Josh) 
Thus political activity takes its place as one lifeworld interest among others, 
to be handled with tolerance. Speaking of a couple of heavily committed 
activists, for example, 
People know what Se‡n and Muireann are up to, but they're not very 
strongly influenced, and that's an example of Se‡n and Muireann being 
part of that group, coming from that group, and finding their own space 
[...] But Se‡n and Muireann didn't ram it down anybody's throat, and 
nobody tried to make them conform to what was going on. (Josh) 
This tolerance, in fact, appears as a condition of autonomy: 
There is a sort of laid-back attitude which allows people to do their own 
thing and is very very tolerant of people's individuality and people 
doing their own thing and coming and going as they please. (Josh) 
Thus movement activity can form part of most of an individual's project of 
self-development, and it takes its place within the local rationalities of the 
network on this basis. This logic of autonomy as self-development, however, 
has immediate effects in relation to the forms of politics which can take root 
in it, as well as in the attitudes taken to the political.  
On the one hand, political forms conducive to this type of autonomy are 
preferred. Thus the direct democracy of the squat or the occupation and 
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their articulate counterpart in anarchist organising or the network of 
intersecting projects and its articulate counterpart in green politics represent 
two possibilities of "doing" politics. Similarly, the immediate, lifeworld-bound 
activity of demonstrations, direct action, the local project or the once-off 
event are preferred to more hierarchical political forms, whether of large-
scale organisation or of clientele-building, whose only possible meaning is 
instrumental and whose operation runs directly counter to the logic of 
autonomy: 
I think the fact that these people have the laid-back attitude of allowing 
people to do their own thing is a mechanism which allows very strong 
personalities and very strong individuals to be able to interact with 
each other without stomping on each other's toes, and the sorts of 
ambitions that those people have, and the way in which they allow that 
ambition to be fulfilled, doesn't involve getting a group of people to 
centre round you. (Josh) 
On the other hand, as we have seen, the political is itself relativised, as one 
means of pursuing or defending the project of self-development among 
others. As Melucci has said, activists engage in movement activities on the 
basis that it has meaning for them, not in terms of its instrumental value: "if 
it doesn't make sense to me, I am not participating; but what I do also 
benefits others" (1989: 49). At the same time, from either a Habermasian or 
a Foucauldian point of view, this attitude is itself a form of resistance to the 
instrumental logic of the political system: participants see the defence of 
personal, psychological and group free space and independence as primary, 
and participation in more organised "political" ways of realising this goal is 
always provisional. Thus local rationalities themselves position the political 
and allocate it a very specific place in terms of the pursuit of autonomous 
self-development. As we shall see, this is also true in relation to reflexivity. 
Lifeworld reflexivity and movement milieux 
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Implementing such a project of autonomous self-development necessarily 
implies a reflexive attitude to social relations, and more specifically an active 
reflexivity, in the sense of the creation of meanings and practices which not 
only defend the "free space" necessary for the project but directly enable this 
self-development, and develop the projects of the self as they move from the 
theoretical into the practical. 
Movement milieux, then, are reflexive milieux, and we can speak with Lash 
(1994a) of a lifeworld reflexivity along with self-reflexivity or institutional 
reflexivity, and attempt to locate movement activities within this logic. In 
particular, if "self-development" is to have any social reality, it must mean a 
change of the social relations within which people experience themselves 
and are confirmed in their identity. This implies a questioning of given social 
relations and a distancing from them; a search for alternative possibilities; 
and an exploration or experimentation with projects, including movement 
activities, which might enable the realisation of new "identities" or a longer-
lasting project of self-development. This move away from unreflexive 
lifeworlds is immediately political, in the sense of raising questions of power 
and control, but not necessarily in the sense of an engagement with the 
institutions of political intermediation (Melucci 1992). 
Distancing from unreflexive lifeworlds 
A logical prerequisite for any developed form of reflexivity is a certain 
measure of distancing from the "normal" and "taken-for-granted" 
assumptions of unreflexive lifeworlds. At its most basic, this appears as a 
personal attempt to find another path: 
People [in the Dublin suburbs] seemed to be content with just kind of 
shambling along, and into secondary school and out the other side, into 
a job, and not losing touch with their friends in the pub every night of 
the weekend, but that wasn't enough for me. I was looking for 
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something other and massively more, something to quench a deeper 
thirst for life. Like zombies, those people. (Mark) 
This distancing operates in relation to the normal assumptions of people's 
class backgrounds: 
Even before I went to college I went 'I want to do a sort of liberal arts 
thing that isn't going to qualify me for one thing, so I can't just be 
pushed into doing a HDip [teaching qualification]', and a lot of people 
said 'Oh, so you're going to be a teacher'. I said, 'No, I don't want to be a 
teacher.' I just wanted to leave Dublin for a while, do a lot of travelling, 
I'm grand. (Ruth) 
Most participants failed in one way or another to take the instrumental 
attitude to education demanded by conventional Irish assumptions about its 
role in providing secure employment. Similarly, many avoided the "obvious" 
strategy of taking the available opportunities in e.g. computers, translation 
or the music business. While this distancing from class assumptions is very 
general, there is also an ethnic distancing for a number of participants: 
There are things you know, but they still have to be right in front of you 
to be obvious, like I always knew that the entire world wasn't white, 
Irish, all the rest of it, you know that all these other cultures exist, but 
it's when you actually meet them that it's different, because they live 
their whole life in a totally different perspective to you, which is great. 
(Ruth) 
Lastly, there is a distancing (for women at least) in relation to dominant 
gender assumptions: 
- You know, sometimes I wish 'Why'm I not like my sister?', you know? 
[laughs] Why do I make life so hard for myself? Why don't I just want a 
normal job, and a husband, and two kids, and a house, and two cars? 
LC: Well, why? 
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- I don't know why, I just don't. [laughs] I just find it immensely boring. 
(Katya) 
As this last comment indicates, these are real choices that have to be made, 
and continually remade, within individuals' lives ("Why do I make life so 
hard for myself?"); but they are also made in relation to an alternative 
habitus ("I just find it immensely boring"). Distancing is not an easy exercise; 
and it depends crucially on the availability of local rationalities within which 
it makes personal and emotional sense. This very often implies a physical 
distancing towards known movement milieux: 
People go [to San Francisco] from all over the world. Usually people 
looking for something, or people who are too weird for the small town 
that they live in. I mean, people come from Ohio, the Midwest, and from 
places where they're just too freaky for where they live, or they can't 
handle how racist where they are is. A lot of people say they couldn't 
deal with how racist it is. (Ruth) 
This suggests something of the working of this conflict between lifeworlds: 
the pursuit of autonomy leads both to rejection by unreflexive lifeworlds 
("too weird", "too freaky") and to rejection of those same lifeworlds ("they 
can't handle how racist it is"), pushing people towards movement milieux. 
Along with the usual forms of Irish emigration, it is noticeable that this 
lifeworld also includes a number of people who have emigrated to Ireland 
from western Europe, as well as a number of Irish people who have returned 
from significant periods of time in the movement milieux of e.g. London, 
Paris or Berlin. A similar clash between unreflexive and reflexive lifeworlds is 
evidenced in this returnee's perspective: 
So after I got back from there, I ended up in college, which was like 
being right back in secondary school again, which was about as far 
removed from where I'd been as I could have got at the time. So I wasn't 
very well acculturated, I kind of disacculturated myself somehow from 
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all that kind of thing, I didn't relate to it very well. I'd lost all fear of loss 
of social prestige or position, all the subtle motivations for the middle-
class Dublin life, they're all based on social position, standing and 
material comfort. All those kind of values I kind of shed [abroad]. 
(Mark) 
The reflexive (re-)creation of self starts from deliberate acts of distancing 
from one's lifeworld background, but for its stabilisation requires an 
association with the alternative rationalities represented by movement 
milieux. 
The uses of other movement milieux 
If this association cannot be face-to-face, mediated participation in other 
milieux which relativise the here-and-now by making present other cultural 
possibilities can be an important building block for local reflexive milieux. 
These are rarely seen as something to be imitated verbatim; rather, they are 
used as a tool for opening up a sense of possibility with regard to one's own 
life - in other words, to enable reflexivity. Thus one participant stresses 
the fact that [those involved] are very well read and are involved in, 
interested in most things. (Josh) 
These are not just individual attributes, but relate to a reflexive habitus 
of (literally) reading other ways of life as a means of gaining distance 
from one's own background and of creating new possibilities.  
So, for example, the American counter culture of the 1960s is critically 
examined as a sort of map of the territory opened up by the reflexive 
perspective: 
What I thought happened in the sixties was that people started thinking 
very differently, not for the first time ever, but that they had this 
wealthy class of people who should have been happy as flowers, [...] 
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and instead they went 'Well, sod this for a game of soldiers, I don't 
want to go to college, get a degree, get a good job and have a huge 
house, mortgage and 2.5 kids'. So then they'd started, you know, they 
started exploring alternatives, and as always happens with that a lot of 
people just spent a lot of time doing a lot of drugs, wandering round, 
getting fucked up, and trying to be enlightened. And of course a lot of 
them weren't enlightened, a lot of them ended up doing heroin, but a 
couple were, so it was well worth trying. (Ruth) 
Other ways of life, then, are not imitated but rather used as a means of 
setting provisional goals for the project of self-development, for its reflexive 
implementation and for the discovery of appropriate contexts for both. Thus 
another participant used the American 1960s as a reference point for finding 
a reflexive lifeworld: 
I suppose I had this idea in my head of coming across a kind of Merry 
Prankster-ish bunch of people who were interested in bouncing off each 
other as much as they could, rather than going to the pub. (Mark) 
Attitudes to movement projects 
Reflexivity, then, involves a certain distancing from customary expectations 
and a greater awareness of alternative possibilities. If it is taken to its logical 
conclusion, it naturally involves making some use of these: rather than 
reproducing existing social relations (albeit with an "ironic" awareness of 
their contingency), experimenting with alternatives, adopting a reflexive 
attitude not just in theory but also in practice. 
I have already mentioned the variety of projects developed within this milieu 
(see Cox forthcoming for an institutional analysis of such milieux). Some of 
these projects are relatively successful, for a variety of internal and external 
reasons; others are stillborn or die rapidly. I am interested here in the 
cultural habitus, in the sense of a general orientation to the world, that 
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enables this experimentation, that makes it possible to "try out" the 
implications of reflexivity. The best way of summarising this is seems to be 
in terms of a general valuation of creativity and "makeability", which as we 
have seen applies to the self as well as to the external world. 
One way in which this habitus appears is in a fascination with form. This is 
of course a very visible feature of contemporary social movements, where the 
effort devoted to formulating and implementing an organisational form will 
often exceed the effort devoted to its ostensible purpose (cf. Melucci 1995). It 
also appears, however, in the enjoyment of simply playing with form and 
ideas, in the elaboration of purely verbal projects, the enjoyment of 
formalistic "mind games", and the "techie trip" of elegant and baroque 
technical activity. It can, of course, become the case that form takes over 
completely from content, or means from ends; this is undoubtedly part of 
the reason for the inordinate focus on rules and procedures that 
paradoxically plagues many movement institutions. If I am right, however, 
this is a necessary price for reflexive rationality. 
One corollary of this experimental and playful attitude can be a lack of 
commitment. The world appears as a series of not entirely binding personal 
or collective projects and attempts at "getting things together", with a 
generalised expectation that different people will be "into" different projects 
at different times. Hence commitment has its costs: 
Most people I know don't want to be committed to anything. Or 
anybody, because they're so desperate to get their lives together, get 
whatever it is that they want to do together that that takes up an awful 
lot of time, so they don't want to compromise that by being stuck in one 
place or one job or with one person or in one country. (Ruth) 
In other words, "getting it together" - creative and reflexive activity in general 
- is potentially threatened by too great a degree of commitment to any 
specific project. The logical conclusion is that it is normal for participants to 
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see the counter culture as something that is ultimately provisional and 
external, in other words, to maintain the reflexive attitude to the movement 
itself. As one participant comments: 
It's kind of paradoxical to want to be part of a group and at the same 
time not yet part of the group. To want to create a comfortable subset or 
define its boundary or something. (Mark) 
The lifeworld, then, is legitimated by its contribution to reflexive projects, 
and if it moves towards becoming "taken-for-granted" in its turn it needs to 
be ditched, and for the same reason it was initially entered. Thus it is always 
an open-ended exercise: too tight an articulation would defeat the purpose. 
The fascination with experimentation and the double-edged tolerance and 
refusal of commitment are ways of structuring interaction within this "free 
space", the skills of living together in a particular way. This may be 
formalised at times in particular institutions, but exists primarily as a way of 
doing things, a common "structure of feeling" geared towards reflexivity.  
This has important costs for movement mobilisation. Not only is comitment 
only likely to projects that have strong personal value, but the lack of 
commitment to the milieu itself makes stable organisation difficult. Virtually 
all participants in this network have spent considerable periods of time 
abroad, for example; the very mobility that facilitates reflexive creativity also 
makes sustained involvement a difficult achievement. This is exacerbated by 
the tendency of social relationships to lose their reflexive edge and become 
"retraditionalised". One participant says of his decision to emigrate: 
[The difference new people make is] new influences, new ideas. If I can 
be excused using a sort of Americanism clichŽ, personal development, 
in the sense that my interaction with these people, whilst it is 
completely wrong to suppose that I can't get anything more out of 
interacting with these people, I had got caught in a rut, where my 
relationship with them was such that something had to change before I 
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could get more out of my interaction with these people. That something 
needed to be other people bringing new attitudes, new ideas, fresh 
outlook on old ideas, anything, into it, would have possibly changed 
that and sort of got me out of that rut. (Josh) 
Thus if lifeworld reflexivity and self-reflexivity are blocked by routinisation, 
"creativity" turns to "stagnation", and the likely response is to move on. But I 
want to argue that there are also other reasons why "creativity" is likely to 
generate "stagnation". 
The costs of reflexivity 
The principle of lifeworld reflexivity implies that all activity, not only work 
processes or political organisation, requires clear reasons and articulate 
decisions. Giddens (1994) has recently explored the pathological effects of 
the impact of reflexivity "from outside" on lifeworld contexts in the 
generation of compulsive and obsessional activity. What I am researching 
here, however, is a lifeworld where the demand for reflexivity comes very 
much "from within". 
It is something of a sociological commonplace (e.g. Berger and Luckmann 
1967) that routine, convention, tradition, ritual and so on are enabling 
mechanisms: they enable the regular production of action without much 
need for prior thought and discussion, they enable a sedimentation of "how-
to-do-it" knowledge and skill, and so on. For the same reason, of course, 
they privilege means rather than ends, exclude the operation of reason, 
reinforce local power structures, and prevent the exploration of new 
possibilities. Yet consider the implications of this critique.  
If a reflexive orientation to the lifeworld demands a focus on ends and the 
elaboration and coordination of reasons for action, democratic agreement on 
the forms of activity, and the exploration of all the possibilities that can be 
imagined or read about by the educated and computer-literate in western 
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societies in the 1990s, this makes activity of any kind an extremely 
demanding business. 
The interest in other ways of life and other ways of thinking about the world, 
the fascination with form and technique, the interest in talking about 
impossible projects and so on then acquire another, immediately practical 
meaning, as ways of discovering problems in play and talk rather than in 
action and conflict. As one participant puts it: 
It does help you if you've got a slight idea about something but it's 
vague, and you're really not that sure, and then you'll be sitting in a 
room with somebody who'll be talking about it and you'll go 'Yeah, 
that's it, that's exactly what I was looking for. Where is that?' Or 'What 
book was that in?' And they can tell you. [...] If you find somebody 
who's already done what it is that you're about to do you can get a lot 
of advice from them. You can get some pitfalls, as well. It's like 'I did 
this for ten years, and it's not worth it. Try something else instead.'  
(Ruth) 
As this suggests, the stakes are high in contexts where neither the nature of 
the self, nor its goals, can be taken for granted, and the risks include 
criminalisation, homelessness, emigration and so on. Where reflexivity 
widens the range of actual options to include all possible choices, with no 
fixed yardstick to evaluate these possibilities and their consequences, choice 
becomes difficult, if not impossible. Choosing itself becomes an almost 
impossibly high barrier: 
If you do have that amount of choice, if you sit down, like for instance, 
at the moment I'm in completely the ideal situation, because [...] I've got 
no ties whatsoever, I don't have to be back in Dublin for anything, I 
don't have to come back for a course, I don't have to come back for a 
job, I've got a job where I don't have a contract. I could leave tomorrow 
[...] my only limitations are money, that's the only thing. There's nothing 
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else. Which is great. But it also means 'Oh no, what should I do next?' 
Cause if you can do anything at all, it's difficult to narrow it down. 
(Ruth) 
Given the costs of reflexive action, then, it is hardly surprising that life in 
this milieu alternates between bursts of enthusiastic activity and new 
projects which do fit the bill of reflexive creativity, and lengthy stretches of 
"null-space", of talk and play, of understructured inactivity. Thompson 
(1993) argued that such an alternation of intensive activity and relative 
inactivity was normal prior to the imposition of industrial labour discipline; 
its reflexive variant, however, carries with it an alternation between elation 
and depression that was presumably foreign to the annual agricultural 
cycle.  
The difference between this and the motivational structure of unreflexive 
contexts is brought out in the following comment: 
At the moment he's still officially temporarily employed by [a removals 
firm], which he has said himself is doing him an absolute world of good 
in that there is a degree of externally imposed discipline which has a 
knock-on effect in that he's able to achieve whatever the hell he wants 
to do, he values his spare time, he uses it efficiently, he gets things 
done, whereas previously he had so much bloody time to do anything 
he achieved nothing. (Josh) 
For those few activists who overcome the barriers of action on a regular 
rather than sporadic basis without such external constraints, this is 
achieved at a very high cost, that of forcing themselves into action, and 
resolving the difficulties of choice and commitment by placing themselves 
under extreme moral pressure. The levels of burnout among such activists 
are then very high, since the amount that needs doing is effectively infinite 
once reflexivity is applied to one's political persona, and because reflexive 
modes of organising are not just extremely labour-intensive but also 
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extremely emotional, since they place one's own personal project continually 
in question and depend on self-exploitation and the mining of this very 
insecurity. 
This can be seen as an additional reason why movement institutions 
commonly suffer from what Raschke (1993) identifies as a conflict between 
legitimacy and efficiency. The reflexive attitude is highly legitimate but not 
particularly efficient. Goal-rational behaviour is illegitimate in terms of both 
reflexivity and autonomy. Those activists who see the need for goal-rational 
behaviour commonly suffer, along with the well-known problems faced by all 
political activists, from a lack of identification with the way in which they 
need to behave in order to achieve their aims: an acute form of the Weberian 
paradox. 
Local rationalities and movement milieux 
These local rationalities are initially formed in the specificities of movement 
milieux. Thus one participant comments of a student occupation that it set 
a framework of the way in which the social interactions that that 
particular group of people have subsequently continued to use: a lot of 
music, people sitting round playing music, talking, often about trivia, 
but there have often been, you know, good serious discussions as well. 
(Josh) 
The resources for the development of autonomy and reflexivity, such as 
books or music (see Cox 1997), are made available through the networks of 
these milieux: 
There's a very laid back attitude to property. People are not particularly 
possessive or protective of what is their property, you know, people 
borrow things from, there's an awful lot of kipple that transfers and 
ends up in various flats. It's not uncommon to arrive in somebody's flat, 
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'Oh, can I have a look through your tapes?' - 'Yeah, sure, go for it.' - 'Oh 
fuck, that's mine, where'd you get that?' - 'I dunno, oh, take it back.' - 
'Oh yeah, well haven't seen that in years'. You know, people don't get 
wound up about it, they just 'Ah shit, I haven't seen that, I was 
wondering where it went'. (Josh) 
Thus the local rationalities we have examined are formed within milieux 
structured by very specific cultural assumptions, as another participant 
stresses: 
The only philosophy I thought that was behind all that group of people 
was, you know this thing, 'What goes around comes around', you 
know, the idea of like, at a simple level, somebody bums a cigarette off 
you, you bum a cigarette off somebody else? This kind of thing, at a 
really low level, but it's true, what goes around comes around. You do 
things for people, the idea is, instead of, I was brought up with a 
favours system, you know, I do this for you therefore you have to do 
this for me. Somebody gives you a Christmas present, you're morally 
obliged to give them one, this kind of thing, whereas I just liked that, 
you know, that people would do things for other people for no apparent 
reason. It's like, I have something that I don't need. You need it, take it. 
(Ruth) 
The net effect of this cooperation with each other's projects of autonomy is a 
reflexive lifeworld built on strong personal links: 
I think it was like a support group. It was one of the closest groups of 
people I ever came across. I hadn't come across groups of people who 
knew each other that well and were that close, which was really nice. 
Knew everything about each other, had been through lots together. 
(Ruth) 
These socially organised practices enable an apparently individualistic mode 
of life to maintain its separate identity. There is a close relationship in this 
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milieu between individuals' continued participation in such practices and 
the networks that sustain them, and their continued development of 
personal and lifeworld reflexivity. At the same time, these practices support 
rationalities that are capable of abstraction and generalisation far beyond 
these contexts. 
I have suggested that a concept of local rationality can bridge the gap 
between the sociocultural basis of contemporary movements, their 
characteristic modes of formation, and their impact on the wider society. The 
implication is that we could consider individualisation and the development 
of reflexivity (Giddens 1990, Beck et al 1994) not as a structural feature of 
high modernity reflected in contemporary movements, but as a rationality 
formed within movement milieux. The suggestion that contemporary social 
movement milieux are a key source of cultural change (Lash and Urry 1987, 
Lash 1994a, 1994b, Sulkunen 1992) would then be directly analogous to 
Weber's arguments about the cultural roots of modernity (1958). This leaves 
open the question of how such rationalities are generalised beyond their 
sources. Before dealing with this, I want to return to the ways in which we 
interpret social movements. 
Hidden discourses 
If social movements, and their milieux, operate under very specific cultural 
assumptions, researchers who fail to take this explicitly into account will 
misread much of what they see in terms of their own taken-for-granted 
assumptions. Despite some honourable exceptions (Diani and Eyerman 
1992), much movement research is unreflexive in this specific sense of 
failing to thematise - and hence notice - differences in culture. The problem 
is reinforced if there is a correspondence of the point of view of researchers 
with that of some participants. The still-dominant academic construction of 
movements as primarily political, and the corollary of research on the visibly 
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political aspects of movements, is likely to be shared by the most politically 
active and organised among their movement contacts, and both can collude 
in this perception of movement as politics. But what if, as we have seen, the 
committed activist is a rather unusual figure, and if their attempts at 
mobilisation render the cultural logics of other participants opaque to them?  
There might then be some value in examining how those other participants 
view mobilisation. This can be illustrated by the example of a student 
occupation. Reflecting on that, one participant says: 
I think most people realistically were in the occupation because it was 
damn good fun. To me, from my perspective, politics is something that, 
and I think it's reasonably common within this group of people, politics 
is an interest, but not the driving force, and those for whom it is the 
driving force, such as Se‡n and Muireann, are now very much 
peripheral to the group. (Josh) 
Another agrees: 
Obviously, the whole thing was politically motivated, but once you got 
in there you were, I spent quite a lot of time in there at the start of it, 
that you had a lot of time to fill, that, you know, you had your time 
when you were doing things and where you were just basically 
hanging round with the other people who were there all the time, and 
getting to know them intimately and getting introduced to things that 
you hadn't been introduced to before. (Joe) 
While participants are aware the other logics of the full-time activists, they 
respond to them in terms of the perspective I have already outlined, of a 
reflexive milieu made up of a series of projects, to which people respond in 
terms of their own rationality: 
I remember sitting in the Coffee Inn, and Pat gave everybody a conker, 
for some weird reason, and we were sitting in the Coffee Inn with these 
weird plans for building this windmill in Dermot's back garden, and 
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Harry had this kind of odd plan for world domination, trying to 
[laughter] bring the Sixties back to Dublin because they'd never really 
hit, which I remember I kind of went 'Well, OK, that's weird, but I've 
nothing better to do for the summer and [laughs] it might be fun.' (Ruth) 
Thus the hidden discourses of ordinary participants coincide with Melucci's 
position of seeing movement action as simply one part of a broader way of 
life for the majority of those involved. Participants are fully capable of 
inserting political action into their own local rationalities, and of making 
links between the two: 
There were a lot of discussions going on about what was happening 
and what people were trying to do and stuff. I wasn't really all that 
involved in many of those. And I don't think I was at any of the big sort 
of decision meetings. If anything, I was sort of a hanger-on rather than 
seriously involved in it [....] I was in the party end of it, and one of the 
things that people there were trying to do was make sure that there 
was sort of a minimum number of people around, so as not to give 
security an opportunity to come in en masse and throw everybody out, 
and I certainly would have been there as cannon fodder in that sense, 
but really just another face more than anything else. (Josh) 
The potential tension between the instrumental rationalities of the "system" 
and the local rationalities of the lifeworld is then also a key element in 
people's attitude towards political action. If researchers are not alive to this 
cultural context, they will see only organisation and the difficulties of 
organisation. 
Much of the literature, however, offers an uncritical (because implicit) 
identification by researchers with movement organisers. There is of course a 
parallel between their situations: both are intellectuals, in the sense that 
both are engaged in the theoretical construction of a "movement" as an 
essentially political entity, and both are involved in the organisation of social 
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relations (of mobilisation, of research) which attempt to involve other 
participants as part of this political entity. 
Yet committed activists (like researchers) are a rather small minority within 
the networks of those they (occasionally) mobilise, and form only one 
element, albeit an important one, of movement milieux. A focus on the most 
active, organised and articulate elements of the lifeworld is in some ways a 
focus on its least characteristic elements, and on those which are in some 
important ways least different from the dominant lifeworld: participants who 
have held formal positions in political organisations, for example, are those 
who are most likely to have followed conventional career paths in other 
respects. Not only is the researcher in a similar situation to the activist, but 
the activist may also be closer to the researcher's lifeworld than many other 
participants. 
This is not to argue that only the most inarticulate  and disorganised of 
participants can speak for movements. It is to say that researchers who fail 
to notice the double hermeneutic, whereby movement cultures are both 
other than those of the dominant culture and divided between those engaged 
in their instrumental rationalisation (for political or indeed economic 
reasons) and those for whom local rationalities prevail, are very likely to 
systematically misread what is going on in the far more stable milieux from 
which movement mobilisations occasionally grow. A fully reflexive sociology 
of the broader movement, by thematising these issues, might make it 
possible to move beyond this self-confirming situation. 
Conclusion: theorising movement milieux 
Movement milieux, then, are reflexive lifeworlds where the local rationalities 
I have described are developed, explored, (partially) institutionalised and 
from which they may be generalised. This can be phrased in terms of 
Eyerman and Jamison's definition of a social movement as "a cognitive 
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territory" (1991: 55), of Wainwright's (1995) analysis of movements as 
engaging in a grassroots politics of knowledge, or in Gramsci’s (1991) 
concept of intellectual activity as at once "theoretical" and "directive" 
(organising) activity. The local rationalities of movement milieux then appear 
as the rethinking and reorganisation of everyday life from below. This 
naturally comes into constant conflict with the instrumental rationalities of 
capital and the state, within the lifeworld but also within the individual.  
This everyday conflict is then a "war of position", in Gramsci's metaphor - a 
struggle over power relations within the social relations of "civil society" (and 
the "soft" fringes of the welfare state), rather than the "war of movement" 
represented by direct challenges to the coercive core of the state. The 
construction of hegemony, or the articulation of counter-hegemony, are 
precisely this practical extension or repulsion of these different rationalities 
within everyday lives, as agents attempt to structure lifeworld contexts in 
terms of one or the other. It is in this active way that a formal rationality can 
be generalised beyond its original lifeworld context, and that social 
movements can be seen as cultural challenges. 
Within contemporary capitalism, groups such as the unemployed and 
students are "decommodified" (Offe 1985): they are temporarily or 
permanently marginalised from the production process and its associated 
structures of domination. From Berger et al. (1974) to Bey (1995), this 
situation has been identified as an important site for the generation of 
cultural resources for challenges to the dominant forms of late modernity. In 
particular, autonomy and reflexivity seem "locally rational" responses to this 
relative weakness of direct domination. 
Such lifeworlds, then, are neither simply passive victims of radical modernity 
nor locations of purely defensive struggles against colonisation by 
instrumental rationality: their own local rationalities are capable of 
communicative rationalisation to a point where they can break the bounds 
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of the lifeworld and spread to others. Whether they succeed in doing this is 
of course a question of the politics of culture. 
In western states since 1968, that challenge to previously "taken-for-
granted" modes of cultural domination has since been met with responses 
geared to enabling a resumption of "business as usual". If Touraine (1981) is 
right in identifying struggles over ñhistoricityî as definitive of social 
formations, then the shift from ñorganisedî to ñdisorganisedî capitalism is a 
shift from a "struggle over closure" (between the dominant "old right" and 
subordinate "old left") to a "struggle over openness", in which the conflict 
between the dominant forces of disorganised capitalism and the subordinate 
"new left", or the counter culture, over just how far openness (reflexivity, 
autonomy) is to be taken, defines the new stakes at issue, and marginalises 
other forces.  
Reflexivity tends to mean a situation where social relations are "consumed" 
reflexively, but "produced" unreflexively; in other words, a diversity of 
"negotiated" readings, which represents a precondition for effective cultural 
hegemony - the ability of the dominated to find their own value in the 
cultural construction of their own domination (Gramsci 1991: 12 - 14). 
Similarly, autonomy tends to mean a situation of atomisation, possessive 
individualism and goal-rational action. The local rationalities of the counter 
culture can radicalise both towards an active lifeworld reflexivity which 
applies to the actual production of social relations as much as to the 
attitudes adopted towards them, and towards a reflexive autonomy which 
does not restrict itself to the pursuit of given goals. 
The conflict is then precisely over the practical meanings of reflexivity and 
autonomy: whether they can form part of a new hegemony to contain social 
conflict, geared around instrumental rationality, or whether they can be 
radicalised to the point of rupture within the kinds of local rationality I have 
been describing. McKay (1996) asks why the British state has adopted such 
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a brutal strategy against the free festival scene, the New Traveller lifestyle, 
rave culture and so on, and notes the paradox that these groups are among 
the most ñenterprisingî representatives of ñpersonal initiativeî and 
ñindividual freedomî. Perhaps this paper offers a pointer to the answer. 
                                              
i I want to thank the participants for the interviews this chapter is based on, 
and Hilary Tovey and Anna Mazzoldi for comments on earlier versions. 
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